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In Development Viewpoint #66, we assessed the performance 
of two contrasting strategies for debt reduction in the US: a 
‘fiscal-contraction’ versus a ‘fiscal-expansion’ approach. In this 
Policy Brief we apply a similar ‘fiscal-expansion’ approach to 
economic recovery in Europe, focusing here on the need, first and 
foremost, to foster rapid growth in employment.
Employment generation should be a high priority for European 
policymakers, particularly because of secular declines in the size 
of the working-age population across the continent. Moreover, 
unemployment levels (especially among young workers) are 
unbearably high in many countries in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. So getting people back to work represents, indeed, 
one of the best strategies for debt reduction currently available.
As in past exercises, we use the State of the World Economy global 
macroeconomic model to gauge the impact of such a strategy. In 
this case, we construct a model scenario that programs changes 
in macroeconomic policies that are designed to stimulate an 
employment-focused economic recovery in Europe (as well as in 
the US).  We then compare this scenario’s results with those of a 
‘baseline’ scenario (based on no change in policies).
We are not interested in gauging short-term impacts alone so we 
extend our assessment through 2030. We present our results for 
blocs of countries (except for the UK and the US) because data in 
the model are aggregated in this fashion.
We start with the policy lever that has the most immediate potential 
to stimulate Europe’s economies—i.e., an increase in government 
expenditures. We also assume that these expenditures will help 
promote private investment. For example, they could be public 
investments in infrastructure, skills training or new cutting-edge 
technology. In order to reinforce the desired increase in private 
investment, we also assume a modest stimulus to bank lending.
Both public expenditures and private investment are marshalled 
to target an increase in employment, not economic growth alone. 
This target is based on the ratio of the number of employed to 
the number of people of working age. We calibrate the size of the 
stimulus in order to achieve a desirable, but also feasible, level of 
this ratio for each European bloc. 
Employment Targets
In the case of North Europe (e.g., the Nordic countries), Central 
Europe (e.g., Germany and France) and the UK, the targets are 70-
74%. For Eastern Europe (e.g., Poland and the Czech Republic), 
the target is much more modest, namely, 60%. For South Europe 
(e.g., Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) the target is also low, i.e., 
62%. 
With the exception of North Europe, these targets would represent 
a significant improvement in employment. But they are still 
certainly feasible in comparison to past historical performances, 
either just before the global crisis or over a longer period.
In order to support the recovery in Europe, we also assume 
that a similar set of policies will be implemented in the US. For 
example, its target for the ratio of the employed to the working-
age population is 72%—a level that the country last achieved in 
2000.
However, if the set of stimulus policies outlined above were 
implemented in isolation, they would not likely be feasible. They 
would probably not help reduce government deficits (because 
of the unilateral increase in government expenditures); neither 
would they likely help achieve sustainable growth in GDP and 
employment (because of potentially adverse impacts on the 
current account). 
Thus, we need to implement a set of more comprehensive, but 
also mutually compatible, macroeconomic policies. For this 
purpose, we consider, in turn, increases in revenue and changes 
in real exchange rates.
Supportive Policies
If future government deficits are going to be contained, 
government revenue will have to be boosted in conjunction with 
the projected increases in expenditures. So, for Central Europe 
and the UK, we assume that net government income as a ratio to 
GDP rises to 25%. Our targets for South Europe and East Europe 
are more modest, namely, 23% and 21%, respectively. We also 
assume a modest target of 20% for the US—though this target is 
still well above the abysmally low level of revenue in 2010.
The last problem that we need to address is the potentially 
negative effects on European current accounts because of the 
projected employment-focused fiscal stimulus. To address this 
problem, we need to set targets for each bloc’s real exchange 
rate. 
As a global reference point, we set a ceiling ratio of 1 on the 
real exchange rate of the US dollar, the world’s still dominant 
reserve currency. Setting a ceiling makes sense since our baseline 
projection (which assumes no policy changes) suggests that 
there will be continuous pressure on the US dollar to appreciate 
after 2011.
We now squarely confront the controversial topic of breaking 
up the eurozone, namely, abandoning the common nominal 
exchange rate for both Central and South Europe. Though 
the pros and cons of such a position remain hotly contested, 
we nevertheless allow the nominal exchange rates to diverge 
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between these two eurozone blocs in order to achieve targets for 
their real exchange rates that are desirable for Europe as a whole.
The target for the real exchange rate for Central Europe is set at 1.3 
while that for South Europe is set at 0.75. These changes are also 
programed to happen quickly. These particular targets signify that 
relative to the US dollar, the real exchange rate of Central Europe 
will quickly appreciate while that of South Europe will quickly 
depreciate. 
Such a reform is designed to remove the inherent relative exchange-
rate advantage of Central Europe as well as the relative disadvantage 
of South Europe, both of which have resulted from adhering to a 
common currency.
Outside the eurozone, the targeted appreciation of the combined 
real exchange rate of North Europe is set at 1.7. In contrast, the 
combined real exchange rate of East Europe is set at 0.55. Also, 
British pound sterling is assumed, relative to the US dollar, to 
depreciate in real terms to 0.9. All of these rates have been selected 
after extensive testing of their feasibility and impact in combination 
with the rest of our assumed policy changes.
Scenario Results
What kind of results does our employment-focused scenario project? 
Compared to the results for the baseline scenario, economic growth 
is more rapid across the board (see Table 1). The most dramatic 
results are evident in South Europe and East Europe. Average 
growth of GDP jumps from 0.8% per year to 3.5% for South Europe, 
and from 2.1% to 5.5% for East Europe. There are more moderate 
increases for North Europe and the United Kingdom (as well as the 
US), and only a modest increase for Central Europe.
Table 1: Projected Average Growth Rate of GDP (%)
Europe and the US, 2012-2030
EMPLOYMENT  
SCENARIO
BASELINE
SCENARIO
Central Europe 2.1 1.7
East Europe 5.5 2.1
North Europe 3.2 2.4
South Europe 3.5 0.8
UK 3.4 2.0
US 3.9 2.8
In some blocs, the increase in the employment ratio by 2030 exceeds 
our target. For example, in South Europe, the employed as a ratio to 
the working-age population slightly exceeds 64% even though our 
target was 62%. This overshooting also characterises East Europe’s 
resultant employment ratio: it surpasses our 60% target by over two 
percentage points. 
Migration contributes to these increases in employment. This is 
evident in South Europe and the United Kingdom, which experience 
an upswing of migrant workers. There also appears to be a return of 
workers to East Europe, a region that had suffered from marked out-
migration after the mid 1980s. However, where there is an increased 
net inflow of workers, such as into South Europe and the UK, the 
impact on the size of the working-age population is not dramatic.
Expenditures and Revenue
In the early years of our scenario, namely, 2012-2015, the growth 
of government expenditures is rapid, but it markedly slows down 
in most blocs after 2015 (see Figure 1). In the UK, for example, the 
growth of government expenditures is 2.6% after 2015, compared to 
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4.4% during 2012-2015. In Central Europe, government expenditures 
increase by 1.7% per year after 2015, a decline from the 3.1% rate of 
growth during 2012-2015.
Even though the ratio of government expenditures to GDP increases 
during the early years of our scenario in almost all blocs, it falls sharply 
thereafter. There are two reasons. In almost all cases, growth of 
government expenditures (the numerator) slows substantially after 
2015 while growth of GDP (the denominator) is much improved.
In blocs such as Central Europe, East Europe and the UK, government 
net lending as a ratio to GDP converges towards zero. Although this 
ratio also dramatically improves in other blocs such as South Europe 
and the US, it remains negative, i.e., between -2% and -3%.
Government deficits are eliminated or significantly improved not 
only because government expenditures slow down after an initial 
spurt. Government net income as a ratio to GDP also appreciably 
improves in the majority of blocs. This trend is attributable, in part, 
to our assumption that governments would undertake explicit 
efforts to improve revenue generation. But the achievement of 
more rapid growth rates of employment and private incomes also 
indirectly helps boost government revenue.
Falling Debt
Not surprisingly, government debt as a ratio to GDP falls dramatically 
in all blocs (see Figure 2). Though debt levels have been manageable 
in North Europe, Central Europe and even East Europe, their debt-
to-GDP ratios still fall substantially. For example, Central Europe’s 
debt/GDP falls from 67% in 2010 to 42% in 2030 and North Europe’s 
from 48% to 9%.
The other blocs with heavy initial debt burdens, such as South 
Europe, the UK and the US, also experience a significant lightening 
of their load. For example, the US’s debt/GDP falls from 78% in 
2010 to 62% in 2030. The latter is a more manageable level. The UK 
achieves almost a halving of its debt burden, from a level equivalent 
to 93% of GDP in 2010 to 50% in 2030.
South Europe’s debt burden is also reduced but not as substantially 
as one would hope. Its debt/GDP declines from 102% in 2010 to 
88% in 2030. In these circumstances, it should be obvious that some 
debt restructuring or relief is desirable, preferably sooner rather 
than later.
Figure 2: Government Debt as % of GDP 
Central Europe, UK and South Europe 
1980 – 2030
Exchange-Rate Impacts
What is the impact of our proposed changes of real exchange rates 
across the European blocs? First, we examine the impact on trends 
in the current account (see Figure 3 next page). 
Already becoming negative in 2011, Central Europe’s current 
account, as a ratio to GDP, becomes even more negative through 
2013. Thereafter, however, it progressively improves, approaching 
a positive 3% by 2030. North Europe’s large current account surplus 
declines markedly but still remains above 2% by 2030. Hence, the 
appreciation of the real exchange rates of these two blocs does not 
prevent them from running surpluses.
The current account deficits of South Europe, East Europe and the 
UK all progressively improve as a result of the depreciation of their 
real exchange rates. All of them approach or slightly exceed a zero 
balance by 2030.
However, almost from the scenario’s beginning, the US continues 
to slide into deeper current-account deficits, closing in on a -4% 
deficit by 2030. Hence, in order to correct this trend, the US dollar 
would need to be substantially depreciated, instead of being merely 
prevented from appreciating. 
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Domestic price inflation is not the driving force of the appreciation 
of the US real exchange rate since the rate of change of the price 
deflator for US domestic expenditures averages less than 2% during 
2015-2030 (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Domestic Prices, Average Change (%)
Europe and the US, 2015-2030
BLOC 2015 - 
2030
BLOC 2015 - 
2030
Central Europe 1.2 North Europe 0.6
East Europe 3.9 United Kingdom 2.8
South Europe 2.7 United States 1.7
Domestic price inflation also remains relatively subdued across the 
European blocs.  For example, during 2015-2030, it averages a low 
1.2% in Central Europe, and a lower 0.6% in North Europe. In East 
Europe, the UK and South Europe, average inflation is higher: 3.9%, 
2.8% and 2.7%, respectively. 
However, none of these inflation rates suggest that our proposed 
combination of an employment-focused fiscal stimulus and sharp 
depreciation of the real exchange rate would cause inflation to 
become unusually high.
Concluding Remarks
In this Policy Brief we have presented the results for various European 
blocs of a policy-oriented scenario generated by the State of the 
World Economy global macroeconomic model. The two defining 
features of this scenario are: 1) a proactive employment-focused 
fiscal stimulus and 2) management of the real exchange rate. 
The first defining feature might appear counter-intuitive since the 
current focus on fiscal consolidation across Europe is generally 
interpreted to imply sharp reductions in government expenditures 
instead of systematic increases. 
Another distinctive feature of our scenario is that fiscal expansions 
are not geared to achieve GDP growth per se, but rather employment 
growth. In addition, the character of government expenditures is 
designed explicitly to boost private investment, not dampen it.
Lastly, we also acknowledge the need to significantly increase 
government revenue in order to contain fiscal deficits, especially 
since revenue levels remain at historically low levels across Europe 
and the US in the wake of the global financial crisis.
The second defining feature of our scenario—which is no doubt 
as controversial as the first—is the active management of the real 
exchange rate of each European bloc. This implies dissolution of the 
eurozone in its present form, which is based on a common nominal 
exchange rate in both Central and South Europe.
Of course, if management of the real exchange rate is going to be 
successful, it will still depend on coordinated efforts across Europe. 
This coordination will not only involve a larger number of blocs but 
must also acknowledge the persistent differentials in their levels of 
productivity, or competitiveness. 
Such an arrangement should help avoid the inevitable recourse to 
the depression of domestic living standards, which is now becoming 
pervasive, for example, across South Europe. The adjustment of each 
bloc’s real exchange rate could replace the need for such drastic 
domestic price deflation.
Figure 3: Current Account as % of GDP 
Central Europe, East Europe and UK 
1980 – 2030
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